The paper proposes a bimodal logic that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge modality and coalition know-how modality. Unlike other similar systems, the one proposed here assumes perfect recall by all agents. Perfect recall is captured in the system by a single axiom. The main technical results are the soundness and the completeness theorems for the proposed logical system.
Introduction
Autonomous agents such as self-driving cars and robotic vacuum cleaners are facing the challenge of navigating without having complete information about the current situation. Such a setting could be formally captured by an epistemic transition system where an agent uses instructions to transition the system between states without being able to distinguish some of these states. In this paper we study properties of strategies in such systems. An example of such a system is the epistemic transition system T 1 , depicted in Figure 1 . It has six states named w 0 , w 1 0 , w 1 , w 1 1 , w 2 , w 1 2 and two instructions 0 and 1 that an agent a can use to transition the system from one state to another. For instance, if an instruction 0 is given in state w 0 , then the system transitions into state w 1 . The system is called epistemic because the agent cannot distinguish state w i from state w 1 i for each i " 0, 1, 2. The indistinguishability relation is shown in the figure using dashed lines. Atomic proposition p is true only in state w The logical system that we propose consists of two modalities. The first is the knowledge modality K. Imagine that the system starts in state w 2 . Since agent a cannot distinguish state w 2 from state w started in state w 1 and the agent used instruction 0 to transition the system into state w 2 . In this paper we assume that all agents have perfect recall, so in state w 2 the agent remembers history pw 1 , 0, w 2 q. Note, however, that such a history is indistinguishable from history pw 1 1 , 0, w 1 2 q because the agent cannot distinguish state w 1 from state w 1 1 and state w 2 from state w 1 2 . Thus, the agent does not know that proposition p is true in the state w 2 even with history pw 1 , 0, w 2 q. We denote this by pw 1 , 0, w 2 q . K a p. Finally, assume that the system started in state w 0 and the agent first used instruction 1 to transition it into state w 1 and later instruction 0 to transition it to state w 2 . Thus, the history of the system is pw 0 , 1, w 1 , 0, w 2 q. The only history that the agent cannot distinguish from this one is history pw 1 0 , 1, w 1 , 0, w 2 q. Since both of these histories end in a state where proposition p is satisfied, agent a does know that proposition p is true in state w 2 , given history pw 0 , 1, w 1 , 0, w 2 q. We write this as pw 0 , 1, w 1 , 0, w 2 q , K a p.
The other modality that we consider is the strategic power. In system T 1 , the agent can transition the system from state w 1 to state w 2 by using instruction 0. Similarly, the agent can transition the system from state w 1 1 to state w 2 by using instruction 1. In other words, given either history pw 1 q or history pw 1 1 q the agent can transition the system to a state in which atomic proposition p is satisfied. We say that, given either history, agent a has a strategy to achieve p. Histories pw 1 q and pw 1 1 q are the only histories indistinguishable by agent a from history pw 1 q. Since she has a strategy to achieve p under all histories indistinguishable from history pw 1 q, we say that given history pw 1 q the agent knows that she has a strategy. Similarly, given history pw 1 1 q, she also knows that she has a strategy. However, since indistinguishable histories pw 1 q and pw 1 1 q require different strategies to achieve p, given history pw 1 q she does not know what the strategy is. We say that she does not have a know-how strategy. We denote this by pw 1 q . H a p, where H stands for know-How. Of course, it is also true that pw
The situation changes if the transition system starts in state w 0 instead of state w 1 and transitions to state w 1 under instruction 1. Now the history is pw 0 , 1, w 1 q and the histories that the agent cannot distinguish from this one are history pw 1 0 , 1, w 1 q and history pw 0 , 1, w 1 q itself. Given both of these two histories, agent a can achieve p using the same transition 0. Thus, pw 0 , 1, w 1 q , H a p.
Finally note that there are only two histories: pw 0 q and pw 1 0 q indistinguishable from pw 0 q. Given either history, agent a can achieve H a p using instruction 1. Thus, pw 0 q , H a H a p. That is, given history pw 0 q agent a knows how to transition to a state in which formula H a p is satisfied.
Multiagent Systems
Like many other autonomous agents, self-driving cars are expected to use vehicle-tovehicle communication to share traffic information and to coordinate actions (Harding et al. (2014) ). Thus, it is natural to consider epistemic transition systems that have more than one agent. An example of such a system T 2 is depicted in Figure 2 . This system has five epistemic states: w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , and w 4 and three agents: a, b, and c. In each state the agents vote either 0 or 1 and the system transitions into the next state based on the majority vote. For example, since the directed edge from state w 0 to state w 4 is labelled with 1, if the majority of agents in state w 0 votes 1, then the system transitions into state w 4 . Since coalition ta, bu forms a majority, this coalition has a strategy to transition the system from state w 0 to state w 4 and, thus, to achieve p. Note that agent a cannot distinguish state w 0 from state w 1 and thus agent a does not know what she should vote for to achieve p. Similarly, agent b also does not know what she should vote for to achieve p because she cannot distinguish state w 0 from state w 2 . In this paper, we assume that members of a coalition make the decisions based on combined (distributed) knowledge of the whole coalition. In our example, coalition ta, bu can distinguish state w 0 from both state w 1 and state w 2 . Thus, given history pw 0 q the coalition ta, bu knows how to achieve p. We denote this by pw 0 q , H ta,bu p, or simply as pw 0 q , H a,b p.
Universal Principles
We have discussed a statement being true or false given a certain history. This paper focuses on the logical principles that are true for each history in each epistemic transition system. An example of such a principle is the strategic positive introspection:
This principle says that if a coalition knows how to achieve ϕ, then the coalition knows that it knows how to achieve ϕ. Informally, this principle is true because in order for statement H C ϕ to be satisfied for a given history h, coalition C must have a strategy to achieve ϕ that works under any history h 1 indistinguishable from history h by the coalition. Thus, the same strategy must work for any history h 2 indistinguishable from history h 1 by the coalition. In other words, it is also true that h 1 , H C ϕ. Recall that h 1 is an arbitrary history indistinguishable from history h by coalition C. Hence, h , K C H C ϕ according to the standard semantics of the epistemic modality K C . A similar argument can be used to justify the strategic negative introspection:
Another universal principle is the empty coalition principle: K ∅ ϕ Ñ H ∅ ϕ. Indeed, K ∅ ϕ means that statement ϕ is true under any history indistinguishable from the given history by an empty coalition. Since an empty coalition cannot distinguish any two histories, the assumption K ∅ ϕ means that statement ϕ is true under any history. In particular, this statement is true after the next transition no matter how agents vote. Hence, H ∅ ϕ.
The epistemic modality K C also satisfies axioms of epistemic logic S5 for distributed knowledge. Know-how modality satisfies the unachievability of falsehood principle: H C K, stating that no coalition can achieve K. Know-how modality also satisfies a form of cooperation principle Pauly (2001 Pauly ( , 2002 :
Perfect Recall
A complete trimodal logical system describing the interplay between distributed knowledge modality K C , coalition know-how modality H C , and standard (not know-how) strategic power modality in the imperfect recall setting was proposed by Naumov and Tao (2017b) . We provide a complete axiomatization of the interplay between modalities K C and H C in the perfect recall setting. Surprisingly, the assumption of perfect recall by all agents is captured by a single principle that we call the perfect recall principle:
This principle says that if a sub-coalition D Ď C can achieve ϕ, then after the vote the whole coalition will know that ϕ is true. Informally, this principle is true because coalition C is able to recall how sub-coalition D voted and, thus, will deduce that formula ϕ is true after the transition. As an empty coalition has no memory even in the perfect recall setting, it is essential for coalition C to be nonempty. However, the sub-coalition D can be empty.
Literature Review
Non-epistemic logics of coalition power were developed by Pauly (2001 Pauly ( , 2002 , who also proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition power. His approach has been widely studied in the literature (Goranko (2001) ; van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2005); Borgo (2007); Sauro et al. (2006); Ågotnes et al. (2010 , 2009 Belardinelli (2014) ). An alternative logical system for coalition power was proposed by More and Naumov (2012) . Alur et al. (2002) introduced Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) that combines temporal and coalition modalities. van der Hoek and Wooldridge (2003) proposed to combine ATL with epistemic modality to form Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic. They did not prove the completeness theorem for the proposed logical system.
Agotnes and Alechina (2012) proposed a complete logical system that combines the coalition power and epistemic modalities. Since their system does not have epistemic requirements on strategies, it does not contain any axioms describing the interplay of these modalities. In the extended version,Ågotnes and Alechina (2016) added a complete axiomatization of an interplay between single-agent knowledge and knowhow modalities.
Know-how strategies were studied before under different names. While Jamroga andÅgotnes (2007) talked about "knowledge to identify and execute a strategy", Jamroga and van der Hoek (2004) discussed "difference between an agent knowing that he has a suitable strategy and knowing the strategy itself". van Benthem (2001) called such strategies "uniform". Wang (2015 Wang ( , 2016 captured the "knowing how" as a binary modality in a complete logical system with a single agent and without the knowledge modality.
Coalition know-how strategies for enforcing a condition indefinitely were investigated by Naumov and Tao (2017a) . Such strategies are similar to (Pauly, 2001, p. 80) "goal maintenance" strategies in "extended coalition logic". A similar complete logical system in a single-agent setting for know-how strategies to achieve a goal in multiple steps rather than to maintain a goal is developed by Fervari et al. (2017) .
Naumov and Tao (2017b) also proposed a complete trimodal logical system describing an interplay between distributed knowledge modality K C , coalition know-how modality H C , and standard (not know-how) strategic power modality in the imperfect recall setting.
In this paper we provide a complete axiomatization of an interplay between modalities K C and H C in the perfect recall setting. The main challenge in proving the completeness, compared toÅgotnes and Alechina (2016), Fervari et al. (2017) , and Naumov and Tao (2017b,a), is the need to construct not only "possible worlds", but the entire "possible histories", see the proof of Lemma 22.
Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the formal syntax and semantics of our logical system. Next, we list the axioms and give examples of formal proofs in the system. Then, we prove the soundness and the completeness of this system.
Syntax and Semantics
Throughout the rest of the paper we assume a fixed set of agents A. By X Y we denote the set of all functions from set Y to set X, or in other words, the set of all tuples of elements from set X indexed by the elements of set Y . If t P X Y is such a tuple and y P Y , then by ptq y we denote the y-th component of tuple t.
We now proceed to describe the formal syntax and semantics of our logical system starting with the definition of a transition system. Definition 1 A tuple pW, t" a u aPA , V, M, πq is an epistemic transition system, if 1. W is a set of epistemic states, 2. " a is an indistinguishability equivalence relation on W for each a P A, 3. V is a nonempty set called domain of choices,
M Ď WˆV
AˆW is an aggregation mechanism, 5. π is a function that maps propositional variables into subsets of W .
For example, in the transition system T 1 depicted in Figure 1 , the set of states W is tw 0 , w 1 , w 2 , w Informally, an epistemic transition system is regular if there is at least one next state for each outcome of the vote.
Definition 2 An epistemic transition system pW, t" a u aPA , V, M, πq is regular if for each w P W and each s P V A , there is w 1 P W such that pw, s,
A coalition is a subset of A. A strategy profile of coalition C is any tuple in the set V C .
Definition 3 For any states w 1 , w 2 P W and any coalition C, let w 1 " C w 2 if w 1 " a w 2 for each agent a P C.
Lemma 1 For each coalition C, relation " C is an equivalence relation on the set of epistemic states W . b
Definition 4 For any strategy profiles s 1 and s 2 of coalitions C 1 and C 2 respectively and any coalition C Ď C 1 X C 2 , let s 1 " C s 2 if ps 1 q a " ps 2 q a for each a P C.
Lemma 2 For any coalition C, relation " C is an equivalence relation on the set of all strategy profiles of coalitions containing coalition C. b
Definition 5 A history is an arbitrary sequence h " pw 0 , s 1 , w 1 , s 2 , w 2 , . . . , s n , w n q such that n ě 0 and
In this paper we assume that votes of all agents are private. Thus, an individual agent only knows her own votes and the equivalence classes of the states that the system has been at. This is formally captured in the following definition of indistinguishability of histories by an agent.
Definition 6 For any agent a P A, any history h " pw 0 , s 1 , w 1 , . . . , s n , w n q, and any history h 1 " pw
Definition 7 For any histories h 1 , h 2 and any coalition C, let h 1 « C h 2 if h 1 « a h 2 for each agent a P C.
Lemma 3 For any coalition C, relation « C is an equivalence relation on the set of histories. b
The length |h| of a history h " pw 0 , s 1 , w 1 , . . . , s n , w n q is the value of n. By Definition 7, the empty coalition cannot distinguish any two histories, even of different lengths.
Lemma 4 |h 1 | " |h 2 | for each histories h 1 and h 2 such that h 1 « C h 2 for some nonempty coalition C. b
For any sequence x " x 1 , . . . , x n and an element y, by sequence x :: y we mean x 1 , . . . , x n , y. If sequence x is nonempty, then by hdpxq we mean element x n .
Lemma 5 If ph 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 q « C ph 2 :: s 2 :: w 2 q, then h 1 « C h 2 , s 1 " C s 2 , and
Definition 8 Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae s.t.
1. p P Φ for each propositional variable p,
In other words, language Φ is defined by the following grammar:
We assume that Boolean constants K and J are defined through connectives and Ñ using a propositional variable in the standard way.
Definition 9 For any history h of an epistemic transition system pW, t" a u aPA , V, M, πq and any formula ϕ P Φ, let satisfiability relation h , ϕ be defined as follows 1. h , p if hdphq P πppq and p is a propositional variable, 
Axioms
In additional to propositional tautologies in language Φ, our logical system consists of the following axioms:
9. Unachievability of Falsehood: H C K.
We write $ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of our logical system using Necessitation, Strategic Necessitation, and Modus Ponens inference rules:
We write X $ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the theorems of our logical system and a set of additional axioms X using only Modus Ponens inference rule. The next lemma follows from a well-known observation that the Positive Introspection axiom is provable from the other axioms of S5. The proof can be found, for example, in Naumov and Tao (2017a) .
Derivation Examples
This section contains examples of formal proofs in our logical system. The results obtained here are used in the proof of completeness. The proof of Lemma 7 is based on the one proposed to us by Natasha Alechina.
by the Necessitation inference rule. Then, by the Distributivity axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule
Thus, by the Negative Introspection axiom and the laws of propositional reasoning,
Note that H C ϕ Ñ K C H C ϕ is the contrapositive of the Truth axiom. Therefore, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
Proof. Note that ϕ Ñ ϕ is a propositional tautology. Thus, $ ϕ Ñ ϕ. Hence, $ H DzC pϕ Ñ ϕq by the Strategic Necessitation inference rule. At the same time, by the Cooperation axiom, $ H DzC pϕ Ñ ϕq Ñ pH C ϕ Ñ H D ϕq due to the assumption C Ď D. Therefore, $ H C ϕ Ñ H D ϕ by the Modus Ponens inference rule. b
Lemma 9 If ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n $ ψ, then
Ci ψ, where sets C 1 , . . . , C n are pairwise disjoint. Proof. To prove the second statement, apply deduction lemma for propositional logic n time. Then, we have $ ϕ 1 Ñ p¨¨¨Ñ pϕ n Ñ ψqq. Thus, by the Strategic Necessitation inference rule, $ H ∅ pϕ 1 Ñ p¨¨¨Ñ pϕ n Ñ ψHence, $ H C1 ϕ 1 Ñ H C1 pϕ 2¨¨¨Ñ pϕ n Ñ ψqq by the Cooperation axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule. Then, H C1 ϕ 1 $ H C1 pϕ 2¨¨¨Ñ pϕ n Ñ ψqq by the Modus Ponens inference rule. Thus, again by the Cooperation axiom and the Modus Ponens inference rule we have H C1 ϕ 1 $ H C2 ϕ 2 Ñ H C1YC2 pϕ 3¨¨¨Ñ pϕ n Ñ ψqq. Therefore, by repeating the last two steps n´2 times, H C1 ϕ 1 , . . . , H Cn ϕ n $ H Ť n i"1 Ci ψ. The proof of the first statement is similar, but it uses the Distributivity axiom instead of the Cooperation axiom. b
Soundness
Theorem 1 If $ ϕ, then h , ϕ for each history of each regular epistemic transition system.
The proof of the soundness of axioms of epistemic logic S5 with distributed knowledge is standard. Below we prove the soundness of each remaining axiom as a separate lemma.
Proof. Due to Definition 9, assumption h , H C ϕ implies that there is a strategy profile s 0 of coalition C such that for any history h 1 :: : w 1 such that h « D h 1 and s " D s 1 . By Definition 9, it suffices to prove that h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 , K C ϕ. Let h 2 be any such history that ph 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 q « C h 2 . Again by Definition 9, it suffices to prove that h 2 , ϕ.
By Lemma 4, assumptions ph 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 q « C h 2 and C ‰ ∅ imply that |h 2 | " |h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 | ě 1. Thus, h 2 " h Proof. Suppose h , H C K. By Definition 9, there is a strategy profile s P V C such that for any history h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 , if h « C h 1 and s " C s 1 , then h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 , K.
By Definition 1, set V contains at least one element v 0 . Let s 1 be a complete strategy profile such that
By Definition 2, there is an epistemic state w 1 P S such that phdphq, s 1 , w 1 q P M . Thus, h :: s 1 :: w 1 is a history by Definition 5. Note that h « C h by Lemma 3 and s " C s 1 due to equation (1). Thus, h :: s 1 :: w 1 , K by the choice of strategy profile s, which contradicts Definition 9 and the definition of K. b
Completeness
In the rest of this paper we focus on the completeness theorem for our logical system. We start the proof of completeness by fixing a maximal consistent set of formulae X 0 and defining a canonical epistemic transition system ET SpX 0 q " pW, t" a u aPA , Φ, M, πq using the "unravelling" technique Sahlqvist (1975) . Note that the domain of choices in the canonical model is the set of all formulae Φ.
Canonical Epistemic Transition System
Definition 10 The set of epistemic states W consists of all sequences of the form X 0 , C 1 , X 1 , . . . , C n , X n , such that n ě 0 and 1. X i is a maximal consistent subset of Φ for each i ě 1,
Definition 11 Suppose that w " X 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n , X n and w
are epistemic states. For any agent a P A, let w " a w 1 if there is a non-negative integer k ď mintn, mu such that
The next three lemmas state the basic properties of the indistinguishability relation " a defined above.
Lemma 15 For any epistemic state X 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n , X n and any integer k ď n, if K C ϕ P X n and C Ď C i for each integer i such that k ă i ď n, then K C ϕ P X k .
Proof. Suppose K C ϕ R X k for some k ď n. Let m be the maximal such k. Note that m ă n by the assumption K C ϕ P X n of the lemma. Thus, m ă m`1 ď n.
Assumption K C ϕ R X m implies K C ϕ P X m by the maximality of the set X m . Hence, X m $ K C K C ϕ by the Negative Introspection axiom. Thus, X m $ K Cm`1 K C ϕ by the Monotonicity axiom and the assumption C Ď C m`1 of the lemma (recall that m`1 ď n). Then, K Cm`1 K C ϕ P X m due to the maximality of the set X m . Hence, K C ϕ P X m`1 by Definition 10. Thus, K C ϕ R X m`1 due to the consistency of the set X m`1 , which contradicts the choice of m. b
Lemma 16 For any epistemic state X 0 , C 1 , . . . , C n , X n and any integer k ď n, if K C ϕ P X k and C Ď C i for each integer i such that k ă i ď n, then ϕ P X n .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the distance between n and k. In the base case n " k. Then the assumption K C ϕ P X n implies X n $ ϕ by the Truth axiom. Therefore, ϕ P X n due to the maximality of set X n . Suppose that k ă n.
by the Monotonicity axiom, the condition k ă n of the inductive step, and the assumption C Ď C k`1 of the lemma. Then, K C k`1 K C ϕ P X k by the maximality of set X k . Hence, K C ϕ P X k`1 by Definition 10. Therefore, ϕ P X n by the induction hypothesis. b
Lemma 17 For any epistemic states w, w
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 15, Lemma 16, and Definition 11 because there is a unique path between any two nodes in a tree. b Next, we specify the aggregation mechanism of the canonical epistemic transition system. Informally, if a coalition has a know-how strategy to achieve ϕ and all members of the coalition vote for ϕ, then ϕ must be true after the transition.
Definition 12 For any states w, w 1 P W and any complete strategy profile s P Φ A , let pw, s,
This concludes the definition of the canonical epistemic transition system ET SpX 0 q " pW, t" a u aPA , Φ, M, πq. We prove that this system is regular in Lemma 25.
K-child Lemmas
The following technical results (Lemmas 18-22) about the knowledge modality K are used in the proof of completeness.
Lemma 18 For any epistemic state w P W if K C ϕ P hdpwq, then there is an epistemic state w 1 P W such that w " C w 1 and ϕ P hdpw 1 q.
Proof. Consider the set of formulae
First, we show that set X is consistent. Assume the opposite. Then, there exist formulae K C ψ 1 , . . . , K C ψ n P hdpwq s.t. ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n $ ϕ. Thus, K C ψ 1 , . . . , K C ψ n $ K C ϕ by Lemma 9. Therefore, hdpwq $ K C ϕ by the choice of formulae K C ψ 1 , . . . , K C ψ n , which contradicts the consistency of the set hdpwq by the assumption K C ϕ P hdpwq. LetX be a maximal consistent extension of set X and let w 1 be sequence w :: C :: X. Note that w 1 P W by Definition 10 and the choice of set X. Furthermore, w " C w 1 by Definition 11. To finish the proof, note that ϕ P X ĎX " hdpw 1 q by the choice of set X. b
Lemma 19 For any history h, if K C ϕ P hdphdphqq, then ϕ P hdphdph 1for each history h 1 such that h « C h 1 .
Proof. Assumption h « C h 1 by Definition 6 implies that hdphq " C hdph 1 q. Therefore, ϕ P hdphdph 1by Lemma 17 and the assumption K C ϕ P hdphdphqq. b Lemma 20 For any nonempty coalition C, any states w 1 , w 2 , w 3 P W , and any complete strategy profile s such that pw 1 , s, w 2 q P M and w 2 " C w 3 , see Figure 3 , there is a state w 4 and a complete strategy profile s 1 such that w 1 " C w 4 , pw 4 , s 1 , w 3 q P M , and s " C s 1 .
Proof. Let s 1 be a complete strategy profile such that
Consider the set of formulae
First, we show that set X is consistent. Indeed, set t H D ψ | ψ P hdpw 3 q^@a P Dpps 1 q a " ψqu is equal to the union of the following two sets
The second set is a subset of t H D K | D Ď Au by the choice of strategy s 1 , see (2). Thus, set X is a subset of
Hence, by the Unachievability of Falsehood axiom, to show the consistency of set X it suffices to prove the consistency of the union of the set tϕ | K C ϕ P hdpw 1 qu and the set
Suppose the opposite. In other words, assume that there are formulae
and sets
such that @i ď m @a P D i pps 1 q a " ψ i q,
and
By Lemma 9 and the Truth axiom,
Hence, statement (3) and the consistency of the set hdpw 1 q imply that there exists (5) and the contrapositive of the Monotonicity axiom. Then, hdpw 1 q $ H D k ψ k by the contrapositive of Lemma 7. Thus, hdpw 1 q $ H D k K C ψ k by the Perfect Recall axiom, statement (5), and the assumption that C ‰ ∅. Hence, H D k K C ψ k P hdpw 1 q due to the maximality of the set hdpw 1 q. Note that statements (2) and (5) imply s " D k s 1 . Then, psq a " ψ k for each agent a P D k by statement (6). Thus, K C ψ k P hdpw 2 q by assumption pw 1 , s, w 2 q P M , statement (5), and Definition 12. Hence, ψ k P hdpw 3 q by the assumption w 2 " C w 3 of the lemma and Lemma 17. This contradicts statement (4) and the consistency of the set hdpw 3 q. Therefore, set X is consistent.
LetX be any maximal consistent extension of set X. Define w 4 to be the sequence w 1 :: C ::X. Note that w 4 P W by Definition 10 and the choice of set X. At the same time, w 1 " C w 4 by Definition 11 and Definition 3.
Finally, let us show that pw 4 , s 1 , w 3 q P M using Definition 12. Consider any D Ď A and any H D ψ P hdpw 4 q "X such that s 1 paq " ψ for each a P D. We need to show that ψ P hdpw 3 q. Suppose the opposite. Then, ψ P hdpw 3 q by the maximality of set hdpw 3 q. Thus, H D ψ P X by the choice of set X. Hence, H D ψ P X ĎX. Therefore, H D ψ RX due to the consistency of setX, which contradicts the choice of formula H D ψ. b
Lemma 21 For any history h, if K ∅ ϕ R hdphdphqq, then there is a history h 1 s.t. h « ∅ h 1 and ϕ P hdphdph 1 qq.
Proof. By Lemma 18, there is a state w P W such that hdphq " C w and ϕ P hdpwq. Let h 1 be a one-element sequence w. Note that h « ∅ h 1 by Definition 7. Finally, ϕ P hdpwq " hdphdph 1 qq. b
Lemma 22 For any nonempty coalition C and any history h, if K C ϕ R hdphdphqq, then there is a history h 1 such that h « C h 1 and ϕ P hdphdph 1 qq.
Proof. Let h " pw 0 , s 1 , w 1 , . . . , s n , w n q. We prove the lemma by induction on integer n. Base Case. Let n " 0. By Lemma 18, there is w 
Induction
Step. Let h´" pw 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n , w n q, see Figure 4 . By Definition 5, sequence h´is a history. By the induction hypothesis there is a history h 1 such that h´« C h 1 and ϕ P hdphdph 1 qq. Let h 1 " pw 
H-child Lemmas
Lemmas 23 and 24 are about the know-how modality H. They are used later in the proof.
Lemma 23 For any history h, if H C ϕ P hdphdphqq, then there is a strategy profile s of coalition C s.t. for any history h 1 ::
Proof. Consider a strategy profile s of coalition C such that psq a " ϕ for each agent a P C. Suppose that H C ϕ P hdphdphqq and sequence h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 is a history such that h « C h 1 and s " C s 1 . It suffices to show that ϕ P hdpw 1 q. By the Strategic Positive Introspection axiom, assumption H C ϕ P hdphdphqq implies hdphdphqq $ K C H C ϕ. Thus, K C H C ϕ P hdphdphqq by the maximality of set hdphdphqq.
Assumption h « C h 1 implies hdphq " C hdph 1 q by Definition 6. Thus, H C ϕ P hdphdph 1by Lemma 17 and because K C H C ϕ P hdphdphqq. By Definition 5, assumption that sequence h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 is a history implies that phdph 1 q, s 1 , w 1 q P M . Thus, ϕ P hdpw 1 q by Definition 12 because H C ϕ P hdphdph 1and ps 1 q a " psq a " ϕ for each agent a P C. b
Lemma 24 For any history h and any strategy profile s of a coalition C, if H C ϕ P hdphdphqq, then there is a history h :: s 1 :: w 1 such that s " C s 1 and ϕ P hdpw 1 q.
Proof. Let w " hdphq. Consider a complete strategy profile s 1 such that
and a set of formulae
First, we show that set X is consistent. Indeed, note that set tψ | H D ψ P hdpwq^@a P Dpps 1 q a " ψqu is equal to the union of the following two sets
The second of the two sets is a subset of tJu by the choice (7) of strategy profile s 1 . Thus, set X is a subset of
Hence, to show the consistency of set X, it suffices to prove the consistency of the union of t ϕu Y tχ | K ∅ χ P hdpwqu and tψ | H D ψ P hdpwq^D Ď C^@a P Dpps 1 q a " ψqu. Suppose the opposite. In other words, assume there are
and formulae
and χ 1 , . . . , χ n , ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m $ ϕ.
By Lemma 9,
Then, by the Empty Coalition axiom,
Thus, by Lemma 8 and assumption (10),
Hence, hdpwq $ H C ϕ by assumption (8) and assumption (9). Then, H C ϕ R hdpwq due to the consistency of the set hdpwq, which contradicts the assumption H C ϕ P hdpwq of the lemma. Therefore, set X is consistent.
Let setX be a maximal consistent extension of set X and w 1 be the sequence w :: ∅ ::X. Note that w 1 P W by Definition 10 and because tχ | K ∅ χ P hdpwqu Ď X ĎX " hdpw 1 q by the choice of set X. Also note that pw, s 1 , w 1 q P M by Definition 12 and because tψ | H D ψ P hdpwq@ a P Dpps 1 q a " ψqu Ď X ĎX " hdpw 1 q by the choice of set X. Thus, h ::
is a history by Definition 5. Finally, ϕ P hdpw 1 q because ϕ P X ĎX " hdpw 1 q by the choice of set X. b
Lemma 25 The system ET SpX 0 q is regular.
Proof. Let w P W and s P V A . By Definition 2, it suffices to show that there is an epistemic state w 1 such that pw, s, w 1 q P M . Indeed, let history h be a single-element sequence w. Note that H A K P hdpwq " hdphdphqq by the Unachievability of Falsehood axiom and due to the maximality of set hdpwq. Thus, by Lemma 24, there is a history h :: s 1 :: w 1 such that s " A s 1 . Hence, phdphq, s 1 , w 1 q P M by Definition 5. At the same time, s " A s 1 implies that s " s 1 by Definition 4. Thus, phdphq, s, w 1 q P M . Therefore, pw, s, w 1 q P M because hdphq " w. b
Completeness: Final Steps
Lemma 26 h , ϕ iff ϕ P hdphdphqq for each history h and each formula ϕ P Φ.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the structural complexity of formula ϕ. If ϕ is an atomic proposition p, then h , p iff hdphq P πppq, by Definition 9. Hence, h , p iff p P hdphdphqq by Definition 13. The cases when formula ϕ is a negation or an implication follow from Definition 9 and the maximality and the consistency of the set hdphdphqq in the standard way.
Next, suppose that formula ϕ has the form K C ψ. pñq : Let K C ψ R hdphdphqq. Then, either by Lemma 21 (when set C is empty) or by Lemma 22 (when set C is nonempty), there is a history h 1 such that h « C h 1 and ψ P hdphdph 1 qq. Hence, h 1 . ψ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, h . K C ψ by Definition 9. pðq : Let h . K C ψ. By Definition 9, there is a history h 1 such that h « C h 1 and h 1 . ψ. Thus, ψ R hdphdph 1by the induction hypothesis. Then, K C ϕ R hdphdphqq by Lemma 19.
Finally, let formula ϕ be of the form H C ψ. pñq : Assume h , H C ψ. Then, by Definition 9, there is a strategy profile s P Φ C such that for any history h 1 :: Suppose that H C ψ R hdphdphqq. Then, H C ψ P hdphdphqq due to the maximality of the set hdphdphqq. Hence, by Lemma 24, there is a history h :: s 1 :: w 1 such that s " C s 1 and ψ P hdpw 1 q. Thus, ψ R hdpw 1 q due to the consistency of set hdpw 1 q. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, h :: s 1 :: w 1 . ψ, which contradicts statement (12). pðq : Assume that H C ψ P hdphdphqq. By Lemma 23, there is a strategy profile s P Φ C such that for any history h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 if h « C h 1 and s " C s 1 , then ψ P hdpw 1 q. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, for any history h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 if h « C h 1 and s " C s 1 , then h 1 :: s 1 :: w 1 , ψ. Therefore, h , H C ψ by Definition 9. b
Theorem 2 If h , ϕ for each history h of each regular epistemic transition system, then $ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose that & ϕ. Consider any maximal consistent set X 0 such that ϕ P X 0 . Let h 0 be a single-element sequence consisting of just set X 0 . By Definition 5, sequence h 0 is a history of the canonical epistemic transition system ET SpX 0 q. Then, h 0 , ϕ by Lemma 26. Therefore, h 0 . ϕ by Definition 9. b
Conclusion
We have extended the recent study of the interplay between knowledge and strategic coalition power (Ågotnes and Alechina (2016); Fervari et al. (2017) ; Naumov and Tao (2017b,a) ) to the case of perfect recall. Our main results are the soundness and the completeness theorems.
